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ABSTRACT: The article argues for a distinction between standard 
“historical thinking”, which aims at interpreting theories, views and 
concepts by considering them in their historical or cultural context, and 
a more sophisticated “thinking of historicity”, which attempts to uncover 
the historical nature of human understanding in general. The latter kind 
of thinking is exemplified, in different ways, by Husserl, Heidegger and 
Gadamer, who all strongly opposed the trend to “historicize” ideas and 
knowledge. It is pointed out that the notion of historicity resembles the 
notion of path-dependence, which has gained prominence in 
contemporary philosophy of science. It is further argued that precisely 
because historicity turns out to be a generic and fundamental 
phenomenon, a part of the human condition, it does not by itself allow 
one to discriminate between more or less authentic or genuinely historical 
styles or genres of thinking or research.  
 
1. Introduction 
There is much talk about “historical thinking” and “historicity”, especially in 
the broadly continental tradition in philosophy. The term “historicity” has also 
achieved prominence in other fields of the humanities (see for instance Hartog 
2015; Kluge et al. in press). Though I readily admit that words are nobody’s 
property, and can be employed for different purposes and with different 
meanings, I will argue that there is a particular notion of historicity, which is of 
central significance to modern philosophy, and denotes a phenomenon more 
fundamental than, and different from, what is usually referred to as “historical”. 
Hence, I will make a distinction between historical thinking more generally – 
which is very widespread, and comes in many different versions – and 
philosophical thinking concerned with historicity more specifically, which has 
been relatively rare.1  
 
1  What I call “historicity” has sometimes been termed “historicality”, especially as a 




 As for the former, broader notion of historical thinking, it could be said, 
indeed must be said, that Hegel, Marx and Foucault’s philosophies are all 
historical. It must probably also be said about Herder’s philosophy, as well as 
about Droysen’s work on the aims of historiography (Assis 2014) and a 
significant part of the thinking of the Frankfurt school. Nietzsche’s genealogical 
thinking surely also qualifies,2 as does the more recent work of intellectual 
historians like Robert Darnton or Hayden White.  
 What is historical thinking? It is a thinking that is concerned with how 
philosophical epochs, movements or conditions have influenced particular 
modes of thought. It is a thinking that highlights the importance of the 
historical context. Historical thinkers differ widely when it comes to the more 
specific understanding and application of this general point of view. Some – 
notably Hegel – understand a specific historical context as determined by a 
larger unitary framework with a distinctive meaning that is accessible to 
philosophical scrutiny. Others see history as more fragmentary and elusive. But 
all proponents of historical thinking share the basic idea of historical conditioning, 
be it by more or less particular events or constellations or grander narrative 
structures. Precisely what this conditioning means is also subject to different 
views, but is seems in any case to entail a restriction or limitation of the claims 
to validity of the modes of thought in question.    
 It is common to place 20th-century thinkers like Heidegger and Gadamer 
in a lineage starting perhaps stretching through hermeneutical thinkers like 
Dilthey, 19th-century historiography and the “historical school” in 
jurisprudence, back to Hegel and Herder. Yet by doing so, one overlooks the 
difference between thinking of historicity and “mere” historical thinking. One 
overlooks the degree to which Heidegger, Gadamer (and possibly others) were 
 
simpler term. Even the more special “historicality” is also used to designate simple 
historical conditioning (see e.g. Wandersee 1992), so it would not help to avoid 
ambiguity, anyhow.     
2 It may be argued that there are other strands in Nietzsche’s thinking which seem to 
place him in the vicinity of a more genuine “thinking of historicity”. It is not unusual 
for historical thinking and thinking of historicity to coexist in the work of individual 




influenced by Husserlian phenomenology and its strong aversion to both 
Hegelian dialectics and historicism. And one overlooks especially how the 
modern notion of historicity was developed in direct confrontation with the 
earlier historical thinking.  
 In the following, I will try to elaborate the notion of historicity, drawing 
particularly on Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer. I will then discuss its 
implications. If historicity is a fundamental and pervasive (that is, exceptionless) 
condition of human existence and understanding, what are the ramifications for 
philosophy and other kinds of human knowledge-seeking? I will argue that 
historicity does not carry as strongly normative implications as is usually 
assumed. Precisely because historicity is fundamental and ubiquitous, it does 
not enable – indeed does not allow – us to discriminate between styles or genres 
of thinking that are better or worse because they are more or less historical. I 
do, however, acknowledge that historicity might carry some moderately 
normative implications and impose some, albeit loser, constraints on which 
forms and modes of thinking are available or appropriate.  
 Although I would like to draw an unusually sharp – and, hopefully, clear 
– distinction between historical thinking in general and thinking of historicity, 
I will not deny that there is a significant overlap. Probably hints and traces, or 
even more substantial elements of a genuine thinking of historicity can be found 
in thinkers I would generally categorize as “mere” historical thinkers. And 
although I will eventually reject the suggestion, it is surely not implausible to 
assume that thinking of historicity must naturally lead one to adopt a more 
typically “historical” approach.  
 Since my aim is to characterize and contrast two fairly broad strands of 
thinking, I will have to smooth over many of the finer differences between 
individual thinkers and positions. Though I will point to certain differences 
between even the proponents of the more exclusive thinking of historicity, the 
reader should not expect any highly detailed textual analysis.   
 Much scholarship in so-called continental philosophy is wedded to the 
idea that concepts and theories should be interpreted in light of the overall aim 
and guiding thoughts of the philosopher in question. Such a view might lead 




plays a specific role in, for example, Heidegger’s attempt to answer the question 
of being, that is, in his “fundamental ontology”, and that this should be taken 
more strongly into account. I am surely observant of the hermeneutical maxim 
that we must understand the parts with reference to the whole; and I suppose 
that my interpretations of specific concepts are in fact in line with the overall 
framework to which they belong, even if I make little explicit reference to this 
framework. That said, the hermeneutical maxim should not prevent one from 
interpreting and employing single concepts or analyses for specific purposes. 
Not doing so risks diminishing their significance and reducing them to mere 
objects of historical interest (sic). Arguably, neither Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology nor Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology was 
ultimately successful. Their legacy consists rather in the many original and 
partially fitting concepts and analyses they produced while pursuing their 
grander projects.3    
 
2. Confronting historicism 
The notion of historicity was developed as part of a critical reaction to the 
historical thinking typical of much 19th-century philosophy and work in the 
humanities more generally. This reaction can be seen as part of a still larger 
critical movement directed at the trend towards “naturalization” or 
“scientification” of philosophy, a movement characteristic of both early 
phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Husserl saw scientistic naturalism, 
psychologism and the historically inspired Weltanschaungsphilosophie as 
manifestations of the same, implicitly self-undermining and unphilosophic, 
attitude. He rejected the speculative approach of Hegel, but was no less critical 
of the later historicist thinking, which he considered a form of epistemological 
scepticism. The distinction between phenomenology on the one hand and 
naturalism, psychologism and historicism on the other is drawn with particular 
clarity and emphasis in Husserl’s 1911-article “Philosophy as Rigorous Science” 
(“Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft”).  
 
3 For an elaboration and further defence of this approach with special reference to the 




… im Sinne einer Schwächung des philosophischen Wissenschaftstriebes, übte die 
Hegelsche Philosophie Nachwirkungen durch ihre Lehre von der relativen 
Berechtigung jeder Philosophie für Ihre Zeit … Durch den Umschlag der 
metaphysischen Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels in einen skeptischen Historismus ist 
nun wesentlich bestimmt das Aufkommen der neuen “Weltanschauungsphilosophie” 
(1911, 293) 
Husserl defines historical thinking as a form of relativizing (of the “authority” 
or “legitimacy”, Berechtigung ) of philosophical views – be it, as in Hegel, on the 
background of absolute conception of history, which is not itself relativized, or, 
as in the later “historicism”, as a relativizing to specific historical contexts that 
effectively undermines the aspiration to absolute validity characteristic of 
philosophy.   
 Heidegger adopts Husserl’s criticism of historicism and 
Weltanschauungsphilosophie and develops it in several places. A very important, 
though somewhat neglected text is his 1920 Freiburg Early Summer lecture 
with the (rather misleading) title Phänomenologie des Anschauung und des Ausdrucks 
(GA 59; Heidegger 1993). It contains both an extensive diagnosis of the state 
of philosophy at the time and elaborate discussions of different understandings 
of history and their significance to philosophy. Heidegger sees it as typical of 
the contemporary “awakening of a historical consciousness” that it tends to 
view present existence (das gegenwärtige Dasein) as a mere “phase”, “level” or 
“place of transition” (Durchgangsstelle), and norms and values as products of a 
historical development. Historical explanations focusing on the genesis of the 
elements under analysis are used to decide fundamental questions (used for 
sachliche Entscheidungen) (Heidegger 1993, 13). Like Husserl, Heidegger sees 
this tendency as fundamentally similar to the trend towards naturalistic (e.g. 
biological or psychological) explanations. And like Husserl, Heidegger is 
strongly critical of the adoption of a mode of thinking similar to Hegelian 
dialectics: 
 
Mann sucht nach einer Logik der Bewegung, des Werdens, nach einer historischen 
Dynamik … Er wird zu Entscheidung darüber kommen müssen, ob die begrifflichen 
Mittel … ausreichen und geeignet sind zu einer solchen Problemauswicklung, und ob 





Heidegger explains the reason for his aversion against Hegelian dialectics in 
more detail in an appendix to his 1923 Freiburg lecture Ontologie. Hermeneutik der 
Faktizität: 
Alle Dialektik lebt eigentlich in dem, was sie bringt, vom Tisch der anderen. Die 
Dialektik ist also doppelseitig unradikal, d.h. grundsätzlich unphilosophisch. Sie muss 
von der Hand in den Mund leben und entwickelt darin eine imponierende Fertigkeit.  
… Dagegen geht die Phänomenologie letzlich in ihrer Kampfstellung an. Wo man 
beides vereinen will, nimmt man die Phänomenologie äußerlich  … Phänomenologie 
kann nur phänomenologisch zugeeignet werden, d.h. nicht so, dass man Sätze 
nachredet, sondern durch Ausweisung. (Heidegger 1998, 43ff.).   
As a species of historical thinking, Hegelian (and other) dialectics is parasitic on 
ideas and conceptions that have already been formed in a historical process. 
This makes it “unradical”, because it works with these conceptions without 
fundamentally questioning their source or validity. Nor does dialectics bring 
forth any original insights or novel concepts based on real demonstration, that 
is, on an analysis of what is given in an originary intuition. The contrast between 
dialectics as philosophizing “from above”, concerned with the implications of 
historically formed conceptions, systems and ideas, and phenomenology as 
philosophizing “from below” (von unten; cf. Husserl 1911, 322), with the aim of 
tracing back such constructed units of meaning to their roots in pre-intellectual 
human experience, is emphasized very strongly here.   
 Heidegger also confronts historicism in the final sections of the extant 
part of Being and Time. He raises a worry that had been voiced also by Nietzsche 
– notably in Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Geschichte – and earlier by Kierkegaard, 
who in Either-Or 2 (Kierkegaard 1992) pointed to the existential insignificance 
of a world-historical understanding: That a certain kind of historical 
consciousness deprives the historical events – and the present day – of their 
reality. It embodies a theoretical, objectifying attitude that is incapable of 
presenting history as meaningful, as something that matters to present-day 
individuals (and also incapable of presenting it as something that meant 
something to people at the time).   
 Historicism is seen by Heidegger as a source of insignificance and indifference. 
Hence it is not just, as Husserl stressed, a source of relativization and self-




does want to distance himself from relativism. The problem is not relativization 
as such, considered as a form of dependence or conditioning. Heidegger does 
himself consider human understanding to be dependent and conditioned. The 
problem is that relativism is objectivism; that it presupposes a neutral standpoint 
from which to identify the conditioning factors. When viewed from such a 
standpoint, the conditioning factors are neutralized and lose their real 
constitutive force; they may explain events, but cannot really render them 
understandable.  
 Heidegger’s opposition, indeed aversion, to historicism becomes very 
clear in the following passage: 
Am Ende ist das Aufkommen eines Problems des ‘Historismus’ das deutlichste 
Anzeichen dafür, dass die Historie das Dasein seiner eigentlichen Geschichtlichkeit zu 
entfremden trachtet. Diese bedarf nicht notwendig der Historie. Unhistorische 
Zeitalter sind als solche nicht auch schon ungeschichtlich (1986, 396). 
The tendency to historical thinking – to see objects and events in a wider 
historical context; to view ideas and decisions as dependent on historical 
conditions – is an expression of inauthenticity. It is a way of suppressing one’s 
own fundamental historicity, keeping it at arm’s length, so to speak. There is 
generally nothing wrong with such an attitude. Because Dasein is essentially 
“factical”, “thrown” and “fallen” – always, to some degree and in some way, 
“absorbed in” its dealings in the world (1986, 173f.), it has an inevitable 
disposition to such self-alienating thinking. Yet Heidegger objects to such 
thinking being treated as an adequate, fundamental philosophical point of view. 
Even philosophy is necessary “objectifying” and so also an expression of a 
somewhat inauthentic attitude. But it should strive for describing “structures 
and possibilities of being” in light of temporality (GA 24 (Heidegger 1975), 460). 
And this is precisely what historicism, and historical thinking more generally, 
does not do. Instead, it describes factors and conditioning relationships as being 
“present-at-hand” (as Vorhandensein), and so deprive them of their intrinsically 
temporal nature and overlook their essential relation to Dasein’s primary 
concerns.   
 The above quote from Being and Time is also significant in that it makes 




and understanding oneself, or one’s age or culture, in historical terms – that is, 
between historicity and historical thinking.   
 Heidegger’ criticism of historicism was taken up by Gadamer, who in in 
Truth and Method points to what he considers the fundamental “aporias” of 
historicism (1986, 222ff.) – the tension between its insistence that claims and 
views should be assessed relative to their historical context, and the 
methodological rigour and self-confidence with which it strives to uncover their 
historical meaning. By practicing historical thinking in this manner, it forgets its 
own historicity:  
Die Naivität des sogenannten Historismus besteht darin, daβ es … im Vertrauen auf 
die Methodik seines Verfahrens seine eigene Geschichlichkeit vergiβt” (1986, 305). 
There are different forms and degrees of historical naivety, however. Thus, 
Gadamer points out that simple philosophical criticism of historicism as 
relativistic and thus self-refuting does not apply to sophisticated views like 
Dilthey’s (1986, 240). This is because Dilthey had already renounced the 
traditional ideal of detached, objective knowledge and accepted the “unity of 
life and knowledge” as a basic fact (loc cit). But Gadamer also notes that Dilthey 
himself remained occupied with answering the relativism-objection and sought 
to progress from mere relativities to some kind of all-encompassing totality 
(1986, 241), and that he also defended, or at least sought, a standpoint of 
external, detached reflexion from which to assess the cultural phenomena, 
which he otherwise saw as basic, unassailable expressions of life (1986, 242). 
Hence the problem with a view like Dilthey’s is not so much some formal 
inconsistency, but rather a performative inconsistency, or, still more precisely 
(because the point is hardly about inconsistency at all), a failure to think far and 
hard enough along the lines laid down by the insight into the historical 
constitution of human existence, to really adopt the historical point of view and 
bring it to bear on one’s own intellectual and methodological dealings. Gadamer 
distinguishes historicism from what he calls genuinely historical thinking:   
Ein wirklich historisches Denken muss die eigene Geschichtlichkeit mitdenken (1986, 
305). 
It remains a somewhat open question what exactly it means to „take into 




section 4. But at least Gadamer makes it clear – taking over a central theme 
from Heidegger’s Being and Time – that it must prevent one from objectifying 
history, or the dependency of human understanding on history. History is “at 
our back”, or, more precisely, history is part of our own constitution; it’s in our 
understanding, rather than an object presented or available to it. According to 
Gadamer, we belong to history:   
In Wahrheit gehört die Geschichte nicht uns, sondern wir gehören ihr (281).  
Again, the precise ramifications of this relationship not immediately clear. But 
it seems likely to assume that because history does not belong to us, we will 
never be able to domesticate it intellectually. It is a fundamentally important 
factor, which we can and should acknowledge as such, but the exact workings 
of which cannot be described with scientific certainty or precision. Hence 
Gadamer’s general reservation towards relying on methods for obtaining truths 
about matters of culture and history follows directly from his understanding of 
historicity.  
 There are, however, also passages in Truth and Methods (like the last 
quotation above) that seem to set Gadamer somewhat apart from not only 
Husserl, but also Heidegger. He has a tendency to speak of history in singular, 
describing it as a kind of impersonal force or factor, in a way that betrays the 
more substantial influence of Hegel on his thinking (and which, one might 
critically notice, seems to come close to objectifying or hypostasising history). 
The Heidegger of Being and Time would probably not object to the notion that 
human beings belong to history. But he would be sharper in his insistence that 
history itself only is in the actual and specific interpretation (Auslegung) carried 
out by human beings. This shows that even without the relatively narrow field 
of thinking of historicity, there is room for differences and nuances.   
 
3. Understanding historicity 
So, historicity is not the same as historical thinking. But how, then, is historicity 
to be understood? What notion of historicity emerges out of the confrontation 





 The first thing to notice is that historicity is a fundamental attribute of 
human understanding, in all its forms, guises and manifestations. It does not 
imply – at least not directly – that human understanding is bound to any specific 
historical perspective or framework. Its most clearly defining characteristic is 
negative: it implies that a “pure”, completely a-temporal and completely 
adequate understanding is impossible. This does not mean, however, that 
historicity renders understanding fundamentally inadequate. In particular, it 
does not rule out that people can arrive at objective truths about all kinds of 
matters or possess an understanding that is both fitting and appropriate; and it 
does not mean that theories or opinions are necessarily biased or skewed.  
 The impossibility of a “pure” understanding comes from the fact that 
understanding must unfold; that it has to be articulated some way of another. 
Understanding is therefore necessarily sequential.  
 In both Husserl and Heidegger, the notion of historicity is connected to a 
recognition of the indispensability of means or media for expression and 
transmission. While this does point toward the role of language, and also of 
intersubjectivity, the observation is still more general. Historicity does not entail 
linguistic idealism; it pertains also to allegedly pre-linguistic and pre-social 
matters, like the workings of first-person subjectivity, as this is understood by 
classical phenomenology.  
 Hence perhaps the most original and fundamental expression of the idea 
of historicity is Husserl’s analysis of the perception of material objects (though 
it contains no explicit reference to history) in Ideas I.4 The perception of a 
physical thing, Husserl claims, always involves a “certain inadequacy” (1976, 
§44); it is necessarily given in mere “modes of appearances”, presented as it is 
through “adumbrations” (Abschattungen). Yet it is precisely the necessity to 
apprehend a physical thing in this sequential, open-ended but “systematic and 
rigidly regular” manner (loc cit), that makes it appear as a physical object; and it 
is the specific ways in which the modes of appearances are connected, the 
 
4 It might be thought that later writings of Husserl, for example the Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften, would serve better as paradigmatic expressions of his understanding of 
historicity. But while they deal more explicitly with historical matters, they tend to 




specific experiential steps which we are forced to take in order to perceive it as 
such, which make us apprehend it as an object of a specific type (e.g. of a 
specific form). This does not, on the one hand, have anything to do with 
“history”, as a narrative scheme or a set of historical events or factors. It does 
not imply any kind of historical relativisation. Husserl simply describes how we 
basically acquire knowledge of physical objects, through perception. On the 
other hand, this does entail a kind of “historicity” in a more fundamental sense: 
It shows how even something as apparently simple and fundamental – and pre-
cultural and pre-social – as sense-perception of middle-sized physical objects is 
“historical”, inasmuch as it has the form of a sequential, temporal unfolding in which 
the significance of what is given at any specific time is dependent on the earlier 
sequences,5 and which, while generally free and unconstrained – I may look in 
this or that direction, turn the object as I like, even penetrate the surface of the 
object, decompose it, or cease to look at it at all – is nevertheless conditioned 
by those earlier sequences, and set on a specific trajectory. For as far as I do 
want to perceive the object as such, and have embarked on this project, I have 
to follow a certain sequential ordering. Again, there is no strict determinism, as 
different routes of perception are open to me at any point; but I have to follow 
some such route, and each step narrows down the perceptual option space.  
 Historicity in this sense thus resembles what has come to be known in 
contemporary philosophy of science as path-dependence (Peacock 2009). The 
general idea of path dependence is that the trajectory of a “system” – be it an 
organization, an individual or collective activity, or a scientific discipline or 
research program – depends on past events and so is time-dependent (Elsner 
et al. 2015). Applied to the development of science, it is often taken to entail 
the irreversibility of certain actions and decisions, though it remains debated 
how far this is actually the case, that is, how strongly (e.g. necessarily) 
irreversible those decisions are (see Dejardins 2015). More specifically, path-
 
5 When Husserl, in his later writings, begins to speak himself – albeit occasionally – 
about “historicity” (e.g. Husserl 1985, §10, p. 44) or the “essential meaning-history” 
(wesensmässige Sinnesgeschichte) of judgments (e.g. Husserl 1974, §85, p. 215), it is 
historicity in precisely this sense he is referring to, albeit now generalized to also apply 




dependence describes how methodological and conceptual choices condition 
the subsequent research process, ruling out certain moves and observations that 
could otherwise have been both possible and legitimate. This does not in itself 
imply that we are necessarily compelled to think in a certain way. The 
reversibility is not absolute; we can reflect on, modify or cancel the decisions 
made, or abort the whole enterprise. Yet these moves will themselves be 
reactions to the initial move. And in conjunction with the natural, indeed 
unassailable assumption that if we want to understand at all, we have to embark 
on some specific process of inquiry (be it consciously or unconsciously), path 
dependence does imply that we will have to consider certain aspects rather than 
others, conceptualize and express matters in certain ways, which are only a small 
subset of the infinitely many ways that should ideally be available. And it is not 
just about inevitable selectivity (though it is surely also about this). It is also 
about a temporally conditioned selectivity, because the option space is determined 
by its position in a sequence of temporally ordered events. In all these respects, 
the idea of path-dependency is quite similar to Husserl’s analysis of perception. 
 In Being of time, Heidegger develops his notion of historicity in connection 
with the often neglected, but central Existenzial (that is, necessary ontological 
characteristic of Dasein) “Rede”, usually translated “talk”. Rede does not denote 
language or linguistic activities in any ordinary or narrow sense. Heidegger has 
not yet performed his “linguistic turn” in Being and Time; his analysis of the 
fundamental characteristics of Dasein is intended to apply to all possible forms 
of human activity and cognition, including pre-linguistic ones. Rede rather 
denotes the fact that a human being necessarily – always and ever – articulates its 
understanding (Heidegger 1986, §34). This might take the form of genuinely 
linguistic expression. But it is exemplified also, and more fundamentally, by a 
human being’s acting in more or less habitual ways, interacting with its 
environment (in principle, this could consist solely in thinking about its 
environment). Whatever it does will, if minimally successful, leave some kind of 
trace that can function as some kind of clue that may be taken up and responded 
to by another human being, or by itself at a later time. This “taking up” need 
not be an act of conceptual understanding, but can consist simply in the clue 




human beings respond almost incessantly to the signs and practices they 
produce themselves. One may, for example, try out a shortcut on one’s way 
home and then, if it turned out well, react almost automatically to this 
“affordance” when encountering it again, thus unintentionally establishing a 
new habit.   
 This universal process of constituting signs and forming habits simply by 
being in the world and articulating the understanding implicit in this being is the 
essence of historicity. While it is obviously also the foundation for something 
like a shared culture, a historical tradition or a narrative (see Heidegger 1986, 
§76), it is as such a more general and fundamental phenomenon. In the Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger makes clear both that historicity is a 
characteristic of human existence (and not a relationship between humans or 
their intellectual achievements and some trans-personal power and dimension), 
and that it is a completely general and inescapable condition – simply because 
what we are is crucially determined by what we have been: 
In jedem Sinne und in jedem Falle ist alles das, was wir gewesen sind, eine wesentliche 
Bestimmung unserer Existenz (Heidegger 1975, 375)  
It may be objected that by elevating historicity to a general and necessary feature 
of human understanding, one ignores the possible existence of a more direct, 
practice- and articulation-independent kind of apprehension, like pure intuition 
or experience or pre-reflective awareness. I have myself defended the existence 
and philosophical significance of such a kind of apprehension (Author 1997a), 
and also criticized Derrida (1967)6 for assuming that every kind of quality or 
presentation is dependent on its place in a larger structure or temporal sequence 
(Author 1997b). Yet I do not think such a kind of apprehension, though 
undoubtedly real and important, is sufficient for genuine understanding. In order 
to understand something, more than just a static vision or singular experience 
 
6 The early Derrida, especially his work on Husserl, could also be said to exemplify a 
genuine thinking of historicity. While I do think my earlier criticism of Derrida is still 
warranted, as Derrida fails to see the significance of pre-reflective consciousness or 
take serious the possibility of non-relationally constituted phenomenal qualities, I now 
see that he does make an important point in highlighting the indispensability of 




is needed. Understanding requires structure, articulation and connection. And 
with this comes historicity.  
 A still more general objection, which is pertinent to the following 
discussion, is that I am wrongly assuming that historicity is an epistemological 
doctrine, or overemphasizing its possible epistemological consequences.7  To 
this I will reply, first, that I hope to have made clear that historicity in Heidegger 
is first and foremost an ontological concept, as it refers to a fundamental 
characteristic of Dasein, that is of, of any human (or comparable) being. The 
same holds for Gadamer’s use of the concept, which he borrows more or less 
wholesale from Heidegger. Even Husserl, who uses the term “ontology” more 
sparingly and cautiously, conceived of historicity as a phenomenon so 
fundamental to every kind of meaningful activity that it could also be said to 
designate an ontological structure (and see Husserl 1963, 181 for an explicit 
characterization of his transcendental phenomenology as “universal ontology”).  
 Secondly, I also hope to have made clear that Husserl, Heidegger and 
Gadamer all focus on the consequences of historicity for human understanding 
in general, rather than for knowledge in particular. It is a common characteristic 
of their overall approach that they attempt to widen the perspective from the 
narrow epistemological concern that had dominated Western philosophy 
through much of the modern period, inquiring into the semantic preconditions 
for knowledge – and the analysis of knowledge – instead. Yet it is also obvious 
that their doing so had, and was intended to have, epistemological implications, 
and implications for science and scholarship. Even if the exact implications are 
seldom spelled out (and it is debatable to what extent there are such 
implications; see Section 4), all three are keen to draws conclusions pertaining 
quite strongly to the scope, limits and significance of various types of cognitive 
or scientific enterprises.  
 Hence if it is argued that I am making it too easy for myself by focusing 
on the epistemological implications of the thinking of historicity, I will reply 
that these seem to be the potentially most direct and “practical” consequences 
that might be derived transcendent phenomenology, fundamental ontology or 
 




philosophical hermeneutics. If one were to keep even more closely to the 
alleged core project or self-understanding of the thinkers in question, one 
would almost inevitably be at loss as accounting for its implications (and so, 
ultimately, its significance). While Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer were 
primarily concerned with describing what is there, anyhow, I do not think they 
thought that these descriptions should have no bearings whatsoever on human 
practice (for example by motivating certain approaches rather than others, or 
highlighting limitations of certain lines of inquiry). Yet I shall also readily admit 
that the fundamental and highly generic character of the thinking of historicity 
does seem to make it compatible with an extremely wide range of cognitive 
styles and enterprises, and that there are good reasons why is should not be 
understood as too strongly or directly normative. This is the point I will now 
try to develop, before nuancing it further. 
 
4. Historicity – so what? 
What are the ramifications of historicity in this fundamental and generic sense? 
What does it mean for human understanding and knowledge, and what 
consequences does it have for philosophy and humanistic scholarship in 
particular?  
 The short answer to this question is that it does not seem to have any very 
radical consequences, at least not for actual practices or the status of specific 
intellectual achievements. Precisely because historicity is a universal and 
fundamental phenomenon, and does not describe any kind of more specific 
relativization or limitation, it cannot justify any substantial reassessment of 
methods, theories and claims. It “leaves everything as it is”. All understanding 
is historical in the sense outlined above. All products of human intellectual 
activity, including scientific theories, interpretations and concepts, are historical 
as well.  
 While I think this is basically correct, and one important lesson from this 
study is that the consequences of historicity should not be exaggerated (nor 
should historicity be used to justify certain idiosyncratic views about 
philosophical practice, or better and worse philosophies), it may still be 




to be completely compatible with the notion that propositions and theories can 
be true in the standard correspondence sense. (There may be other problems 
with the idea of correspondence, but that is not relevant here). For 
correspondence is not affected by the genesis, or place in a temporal sequence, 
of the semantic unit (e.g. proposition) that assumedly is the bearer of truth. 
Which proposition is uttered (and so which concepts are employed in a 
representational act) may depend on the utterance’s place in a temporal 
sequence; but when the proposition is grasped or uttered, its truth depends 
solely on whether it corresponds to actual states of affairs or not. Such a view 
resembles Max Weber’s famously complex view of objectivity in the social 
sciences: Questions asked by scholars reflect specific interests and delineate the 
object under study in one of infinitely many ways. But once they are asked, they 
have definite, objective answers: 
Daraus folgt nun aber selbstverständlich nicht, daß auch die kulturwissenschaftliche 
Forschung nur Ergebnisse haben könne, die »subjektiv« in dem Sinne seien, daß sie für den 
einen gelten und für den andern nicht. Was wechselt, ist vielmehr der Grad, in dem sie 
den einen interessieren und den andern nicht. Mit anderen Worten: was Gegenstand der 
Untersuchung wird, und wie weit diese Untersuchung sich in die Unendlichkeit der 
Kausalzusammenhänge erstreckt, das bestimmen die den Forscher und seine Zeit 
beherrschenden Wertideen; – im Wie?, in der Methode der Forschung, ist der leitende 
»Gesichtspunkt« zwar – wie wir noch sehen werden – für die Bildung der begrifflichen 
Hilfsmittel, die er verwendet, bestimmend, in der Art ihrer Verwendung aber ist der 
Forscher selbstverständlich hier wie überall an die Normen unseres Denkens 
gebunden. Denn wissenschaftliche Wahrheit ist nur, was für alle gelten will, die 
Wahrheit wollen. (Weber 1983, 173f.).  
Weber may seem to be still leaning towards a kind of “mundane” historical 
thinking (or historicism), inasmuch as refers to the “dominant value-ideas” of 
the researcher’s own time as likely conditioning factors. He does not seem to 
recognize the more general phenomenon of historicity, which does not 
necessarily involve culturally transmitted ideas, but reflects the more 
fundamental fact that humans are temporal and necessarily self-interpreting and 
self-articulating beings. Yet his distinction between the choice of object and 
perspective and the issue of truth is relevant nonetheless. For historicity can be 
said to imply that we are always – and already – relating selectively to reality, in 




always depend on dominant ideas of the time; but they are historical 
nonetheless, in that they have been formed by earlier acts that were themselves 
selective, and dependent on still earlier acts.  
 While this arguably does not undermine the notion of objective truth, nor 
rules out that some views and theories may be epistemically superior to others, 
and even can be known by us to be so, it does sound like it must have some 
serious ramifications for our attempts to know and understand reality. For one 
thing, it sounds like a sort of memento – a reminder that we ought not take any 
theory or interpretation, however convincing it might appear, for more than it 
is (that is, more than one among many possible representations). Thinkers of 
historicity thus tend to a kind of – albeit qualified – historical scepticism. This 
is perhaps most vivid in the case of Gadamer (and other representatives of 
philosophical hermeneutics, like Odo Marquard (e.g. Marquard 2007) and 
Helmuth Plessner (see e.g. Benk 1987)). For Gadamer, the appropriate 
response to the allegedly fundamental insight that we “belong to history” seems 
to be a kind of – fairly strong – intellectual humility. Without precisely defining 
them (an attempt to do so would arguably itself be an example of intellectual 
overconfidence), he suggests that there are historically grounded constraints on 
the range, depth and purity of the understanding and knowledge that human 
beings are able to attain (and should try to obtain in the first place). His whole 
way of talking about history and tradition implies that these should be objects 
of respect, if not awe – in contrast to the dissection and controlling attitude of 
scientific historicism. This is so, even though Gadamer in his later debate with 
Habermas goes to considerable lengths in trying to distance himself from a 
blindly tradition-respecting conservatism and agreeing that the empirical 
sciences are “more than just an arbitrary language game” (Gadamer 1967, 245).8  
 
8 The same goes for Gadamer’s replies to Betti and Hirsch, who, from the standpoint 
of more traditional, scientifically minded hermeneutics, have accused him of 
subjectivism. His assurance that philosophical hermeneutics is concerned with the very 
conditions for (every possible) understanding, and so does not pertain to 
methodological questions, does not prevent him presenting if not a methodological 
ideal, then a view of the nature with indirect methodological implications. This can 
seen even from Gadamer’s actual response to Betti, that is in effect much less 
conciliatory as the diplomatic framing and popular resumes suggest (Gadamer 1965, 




 By contrast, the early Heidegger of Being and Time seems to have been more 
optimistic with regards to the prospect of producing ground-breaking and 
genuinely revealing philosophical analyses in spite – or rather by means – of the 
recognition of historicity as an essential part of the human condition. (Some 
would say that this was what he came to later see as the fundamental flaw in his 
early existential philosophy, and the reason for his subsequent “turn” (Kehre) 
towards a less systematic approach to philosophy; this view seems supported 
by the fact that Heidegger broke off the work on Being and Time in the middle 
of his analyses of historicity and temporality). Yet already in Being and Time, 
Heidegger does himself suggest that there may be an intimate connection 
between historicity and historical thinking: 
Wenn das Sein des Daseins grundsätzlich geschichtlich ist, dann bleibt offenbar jede 
faktische Wissenschaft diesem Geschehen verhaftet. Die Historie hat aber noch in 
einer eigenen und vorzüglichen Weise die Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins zur 
Voraussetzung (1986, 392) 
Heidegger here claims that factual science is “in the grip of” historicity, 
seemingly indicating that it is constrained by its historical preconditions, much 
like Gadamer suggests. However, it becomes clear that this connection has 
consequences primarily for the science of history. Heidegger argues that history 
(as a science) must be orientated towards the existential possibilities of actual 
Dasein and therefore not strive for universality, but rather devote itself to 
objects and perspectives stemming from the existential (existenziell, that is, 
“ontically” and concretely existential) choice of Dasein’s historicity (Heidegger 
1986, 395). Characteristically, however, historicity is here described as the 
primary subject; the choice is Dasein’s only in a secondary sense – it is the choice 
of its historicity, and so obviously strongly conditioned by it – an alternativeless 
choice.  
 These reflections on the relationship between historicity and historical 
conditioning and constraining raise two questions, one about the possibly 
negative and one about the possibly more positive implications of historicity. 
First, the question naturally arises whether thinking of historicity is not just a 
 
(see e.g. Gadamer 1967, 254, where his criticism of “naïve objectivism” is coupled with 




kind of second-order historicism – a relativization of historical relativism, which 
detects the blind spot in standard first-order relativism, the apparently irrelative 
perspective of the relativizer (or “historizer”), and then applies relativism to the 
relativizer herself. This seems to be what Nietzsche suggested with his famous 
triumphantly defiant remark in Beyond Good and Evil, about his own apparently 
relativist view that even the worldview of the natural sciences is just one 
possible interpretation among many others:  
Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur Interpretation ist – und ihr werdet eifrig genug sein, dies 
einzuwenden? – nun, um so besser (Nietzsche 1977, 586 (Aphorism 22))    
Nietzsche’s own example also shows, however, that the normative implications 
of such second-order historicism are also far from clear. It can be taken to entail 
a necessary intellectual humility, as Gadamer would have it, seeing it as limiting 
claims to validity and requiring a cautious, less self-assured attitude. But it can 
just as well be seen as liberating, as allowing one to stick to one’s preferred 
approach and push forward with it, as Nietzsche himself appears to have 
thought. For the recognition of multiple perspectives, of the partial and 
aspectual nature of conceptually articulated understanding, does not compel 
one to see at as “undermining” any particular perspective. Viewing an idea as 
invalid or false presupposes some kind of neutral standard from which to judge 
it as such. Moreover, the point that historicity does not rule out objective truth 
still holds, even if it is understood as a kind of second-order relativism. The 
doctrine of historicity could, though it is not itself exempt from the effects of 
the very phenomenon it describes, nevertheless be true. Moreover, perspectives 
can be more or less apt, more or less comprehensive, more or less fruitful and 
the like. There is nothing in the doctrine of historicity that implies that all views 
and ideas are equally right or good, just because they are all manifestations of 
historicity (or path dependent; paths can surely be better or worse.  
 It is highly plausible that all human understanding is historical in the 
generic (“historicity”-) sense outlined above (it is hardly conceivable how it 
could be otherwise). It is much more of an open question if and to what extent 
human understanding is conditioned by specific factors, be it certain traditions, 
cultural ideas or habits, languages or economic factors It is likely that it is almost 




of these factors. But this falls short of a historical determinism, since it does 
not rule out that humans sometimes succeed in thinking independently of such 
specific factors.  
 Now to the potentially positive (though not necessarily welcome) 
normative implications of historicity. It is often suggested that historicity not 
only sets limits on (or effectively renders futile) “ahistorical”, systematic or 
“scientific” philosophizing, for example in the style of analytical philosophy – 
which is allegedly “naïve” and superficial, because it ignores its own 
presuppositions and limitations. According to this view, historicity also 
engenders a need to history more seriously, thus again forging a link between 
historicity and historical thinking more generally. And so it is widely assumed 
that in order to avoid ahistorical naivety and achieve sufficient depth in one’s 
philosophical thinking, one has to make it philosophically informed, perhaps to 
think “with” or “through” history. This is for example how Brian Leiter 
understands the implications of Gadamer’s hermeneutics (Leiter 2004).  
 Historical awareness can, however, take many different forms and have 
many different objects. Not only does the requirement to make one’s thinking 
philosophically informed leave it open which aspects of history should inform 
it, and in what way. It does not even require the conscientious philosopher to 
be aware of history in a scientific fashion, as this is arguably just one among 
many possible ways of “relating to it” or “taking it into account” – and 
according to Heidegger, for example, it is a derivate mode of understanding, 
unable to capture the most significant aspects of history.       
 Hence according to some versions of the idea that historicity engenders a 
need for historical awareness, it requires one to be specifically responsive to a 
in some sense more “essential” history (and ignore the mere “factual” 
circumstances). Two types of criteria for such essentiality have been suggested: 
According to Heidegger, it is Dasein’s own authentic, future-directed self-
understanding that determines which aspects of history should be given 
significance – not as the result of any rational deliberation, but simply as a part 
of Dasein’s interested and resolute being-in-the-world, which implies a taking 
over of certain possibilities of authentic existing, that have been “handed down” 




1986, §74). Heidegger even speaks of this existential re-activation of history as 
Dasein’s “choosing its heroes”, thus stressing its strongly normative character:    
Daß die Entschlossenheit ausdrücklich um die Herkunft der Möglichkeiten weiß, auf 
die sie sich entwirft, ist nicht notwendig. Wohl aber liegt in der Zeitlichkeit des Daseins 
... die Möglichkeit, das existenzielle Seinkönnen, darauf es sich entwirft, ausdrücklich 
aus dem überlieferten Daseinsverständnis zu holen. Die auf sich zurückkommende, 
sich überliefernde Entschlossenheit wird dann zur Wiederholung einer 
überkommenen Existenzmöglichkeit. Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrückliche 
Überlieferung, das heißt der Rückgang in Möglichkeiten des dagewesenen Daseins. 
Die eigentliche Wiederholung einer gewesenen Existenzmöglichkeit – dass das Dasein 
sich seinen Helden wählt – gründet existenzial in der vorlaufenden Entschlossenheit 
(Heidegger 1986, §74, 385). 
The “selection criterion” is, ultimately, which aspects and representations 
resonate most with one’s authentic self – with whom one is, and not least with 
whom one is about to become. Heidegger also speaks about resoluteness as the 
“loyalty of existence to [Dasein’s] own self” (Heidegger 1986, §75). Historicity 
obliges one to in some way remain faithful to, and continue, one’s historical 
path, which Heidegger also describes simply as fate (ibid. §74).9 (Compare again 
the similarities with the notion of path dependence!). It should be noted, 
however, that Heidegger does not take this idea of loyalty to one’s self to have 
the same sort of conservative implications as has, for example, Gadamer’s idea 
of “belonging to history”. Rather we have here two very different kinds of 
conservative thinking, both rooted in the notion of historicity, but with 
different normative conclusions being drawn. Heidegger suggests that one 
might remain loyal to oneself and one’s heritage even when (and perhaps only 
when) acting more or less revolutionarily; forging bold interpretations and 
taking resolute and consequential decisions. Gadamer on the other hand, 
represents the more urbanised and civilized conservatism of the post WW2-era, 
by suggests a reserved and respectful appropriation of one’s cultural heritage as 
the most appropriate response to it.  
 The idea that historical relevance should be determined by existential 
concerns might seem almost outrageously “subjective”. But the idea that certain 
 
9 For a general criticism of the idea that one’s culturally formed identity should be seen 




ideas stand out as particularly fertile and representative of their time, and that 
some persons and personal moods or conditions are more sensitive and 
responsive to them, is more than just a Heideggerian idiosyncracy. The same 
can be said of the related idea that by exhibiting this sensitivity, one might 
manage to get “in tune with” or “tap into” history (see Klausen 2014 for a 
variety of examples from 19th and 20th Century philosophy and literature). Nor 
is the idea epistemologically crazy. It is structurally similar to the fundamental 
notion of mainstream epistemology that certain appearances or sources are 
particularly indicative of the truth of a certain subject matter, and that some 
persons may be especially competent simply in virtue of their dispositions to 
notice and act on such indications, without necessarily knowing that or why this 
is so.  
 A more popular and seemingly less provocative criterion, albeit one that 
might seem less consistent with the basic notion of historicity, is that certain 
ideas and notions from the history of philosophy deserves particular attention 
because of their later influence, which also shows them to have been in some 
way more deeply or genuinely representative of the state of philosophy of their 
time. Gadamer’s idea of Wirkungsgeschichte forges such a connection between 
tradition, transmission of ideas and the “objective” significance. Thus, the 
history of the philosophy of the middle and later 19th Century is typically 
understood as having been dominated, or most adequately represented by, 
Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche, though these were much less read or 
immediately influential than, say, Lotze, Moleschott or Bain. A particularly vivid 
example of this view, based on a concern for both existential significance and 
Wirkungsgeschichte, is Karl Löwith’s notion of “authentic history” (Löwith 1991).10  
 Using the “test of history” to filter out those elements of past history that 
ought to inform one’s thinking seems, in effect, much like a self-amplification of 
historicity: A road has been taken, and this very same road is then used also to 
reconstruct the process that got us there. Heidegger’s approach seems more 
 
10 For a criticism of Löwith’s dismissal of otherwise seemingly significant philosophical 





subtle, and also allows for the possibility of deviating from the path laid down 
by tradition. His own project in Being and Time (and the lectures that were 
supposed to form part of the overall work) was thought to consist in first 
tracing the historical genesis of our contemporary understanding, with the aim 
of subsequently “destroying” this dependency on traditional notions and so 
getting closer to the phenomena “themselves”, which he intended to re-
describe in a terminology that was less objectifying and more sensitive to the 
temporal constitution of human understanding (see e.g. Heidegger 1975, 
461ff.). Such an attempt does seem to make sense; it is not precluded by 
historicity, which does not compel one to stick to any one particular path or 
treat well-established views with particular respect. On the other hand, both the 
destruction and the subsequent reconstruction will, of course, be affected by 
historicity.  
 We should not in general rule out that there might be more or less 
appropriate ways of responding to historicity. It is not inconceivable that some 
may be more in tune with history, or have been set on a more fruitful path than 
others, and are therefore also more competent at singling out those aspects of 
history that are moth worthy of attention, or most existentially significant. But 
nor is it highly plausible that such epistemic authority is easy to determine, or 
that claims to it should be taken at face value.11 The modesty and pluralism 
which seems to be, at least in some sense and to some degree, entailed by 
historicity, should also engender a cautious and non-judgmental stance towards 




11 I would, however, stand by my former claim, and not consider it impossible to 
determine such authority. It would be in keeping with the Aristotelian strand in 
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s thinking to assume that people that are known to have 
been socialized and educated in a certain way (and exposed to a certain range of 
paradigmatic cases) have a special epistemic authority. Such a view could also be 
supported by apparent insights from epistemological reliabilism and naturalistic 
theories of expertise (e.g. Goldman 2001) and learning. But knowing who the real 






Historicity, as understood by Heidegger and Gadamer – and to some extent 
already by Husserl – is a very fundamental and generic phenomenon. In 
contrast to “ordinary” historical thinking, acknowledging it does not entail that 
thoughts and ideas should be seen in any particular historical context. Rather it 
implies that all contexts are equally historical.  
 It may seem to some that I have been trivializing the notion of historicity. 
But while I do object to the view that historicity somehow privileges studies 
informed by certain items of historical knowledge, I am more open to the 
suggestion that it does call for some – perhaps even considerable – degree of 
humility with respect to views and ideas that otherwise seem very convincing. 
Insight into historicity, as a universal and fundamental phenomenon, should 
make one less certain about “our” so-called “best theories” – not about whether 
they are really good, or even the best, according to some specific set of criteria, 
but about whether they are singularly superior and represent their subject 
matter uniquely and exhaustibly. It should also make one take seriously a wider 
range of hypotheses, sometimes also “rewinding” the reasoning that led us 
where we are (in their very different ways, this was what Husserl and Heidegger 
attempted; and with a reconstructive, and not just destructive or suspicious 
intention). This is a significant normative conclusion, albeit not one that suffices 
for dismissing any specific philosophical genre or approach. Philosophers well 
versed in the history of their discipline may rightly criticize present-day 
metaphysicians of ignoring problems or ideas that surfaced much earlier, and 
see them as condemned to repeat history, including its mistakes. But present-
day metaphysicians may, with no less justice, criticize those of their colleagues 
who insist of thinking “with” history for not availing themselves of more 
recently developed conceptual tools and distinctions, which are just as much 
the workings of historicity, and might just as well – or sometimes just as badly 
– capture important aspects of reality.   
 It should also be noted that the more standard historical thinking, which 
I have otherwise set to one side, might also be quite legitimate and genuinely 
illuminating. For one thing, it is not ruled out by historicity any more than is 




Heidegger and Gadamer, diagnosed a certain naivety in historical thinking, it is 
quite possible to consider historicity irrelevant to one’s specific aim, and stick 
to a more “mundane”, straightforwardly historizing approach. While I think the 
generic notion of historicity undoubtedly captures a real phenomenon, it could 
be argued that its significance is less than thinkers in the phenomenological and 
hermeneutical tradition have assumed. And if it is fundamentally significant, 
this need not imply that it must render specific historical explanations irrelevant 
or false. I have myself briefly resorted to “historical thinking” in this article, for 
example by linking Gadamer’s moderate form of conservatism with post-WW2 
culture, and by seeing phenomenology in the larger context of an opposition to 
speculative philosophy. When accompanied by the recognition that such 
contextualization is itself only a partial and path-dependent (e.g. dependent on 
specific categorizations and descriptions of historical periods), such ad hoc 
historical thinking seems unproblematic. Like other views and interpretations, 
its claim to epistemic significance can be defended by invoking a variety of 
criteria, besides its own historical influence, like empirical adequacy, predictive 
and pragmatic usefulness, or intellectual fertility. 
 Insight into the ubiquity of historicity is not without consequences, but it 
is not the kind of insight that could streamline or discipline philosophy into 
certain formats or genres. Nor can it be used to dismiss certain questions as 
futile or certain topics as being no longer open to serious study. The latter 
would require precisely the ahistorical perspective from which to judge, and 
certain knowledge of the unique “course of history”, which historicity seems to 
rule out. Perhaps surprisingly, the kind of philosophy that may be most difficult 
to square with historicity is the one whose practitioners are most keen to invoke 
it. For those who think that historicity strongly privileges their own preferred 
way of philosophizing (for example by constantly revisiting and quoting the 
top-two ancient Greek and the top-five German philosophers of the 18th to the 
20th Century) still owe us a convincing argument for why this should be so – 
and still more an explanation of how this could be compatible with historicity.12 
 
12 Thanks to Thor Hennelund Nielsen, Thomas Schwarz Wentzer, Jesper Lundsfryd 
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